In the aftermath of the February 28th protests over the deadly Tempi accident, the omnipotence of the government of Kyriakos Mitsotakis did not simply show its cracks, but collapsed completely. Although the communication miracle of this government is no longer alive, New Democracy is still the strongest party in the country, while the opposition (in its entirety!) remains weak, consumed by petty politics and without providing a governmental counter-proposal. However, in response to Dora Bakoyannis' statement that "governments do not fall from protests": they most definitely fall!
Some of you may be thinking, perhaps, of the "temporary people's rage" and "maybe it will pass, Tempi and even their dead will be forgotten" by the next elections in 2027; after all, the government strategically planned to deliver a multitude of projects at that time, from the extension of the line to Kalamaria on the Thessaloniki Metro, to the flyover road, to the first major construction projects in Elliniko, going as far as the safeguarding of the railway network throughout Greece. All projects for the completion of which New Democracy played a key role, while it planned - not coincidentally - to be delivered shortly before the next expected parliamentary elections in order to control the positive reviews and create a favorable political impression on the electorate. Even though the GPO poll shows ND at 23.1%, MRB at 20%, it is known that electoral attitudes change and that the people usually decide what they will vote for in the last months, if not days, before the election (and this is provided they decide to respect their constitutional obligation and attend the polling stations to exercise their electoral duty). But are things that simple?
The dissolution of the Mitsotakis phenomenon does not stem solely from the heinous Tempi crash, although it is in large part due to the deeply shady handling of the accident by the government. Indeed, the popular anti-government anger is focused on Tempi. But what do Tempi mean for Greece? Probably the largest rally in the history of the modern Greek state, the rally of February 28ης was not merely a customary funeral, nor a memorial service. People neither came out en masse to cry, nor to just symbolically mourn. After all, a protest is not primarily an expression of mourning, regardless of the fact that mourning may constitute an element of it. People came out to show their anger at the alleged (now apparent: personal opinion of the writer without seeking to interpret the judicial verdict preemptively) involvement of the executive branch in judicial proceedings. It is for the sense of the expansion of the deep state. For the marginal and primitive “feeling of justice” that is being suffocated. Amidst all this, in a generalized climate of doubts against the government, the despair of Greeks who, uncertain about the future, are also finding a way to vent for the progressive contraction of their real income they are experienceing in recent years.
Both Tempi and everything mentioned above collectively burden the Mitsotakis government. The data on both the state of the rule of law in the country (the “Human Rights and Democracy in the World and the European Union’s Policy on the Matter – Annual Report 2024” of the European Parliament is indicative) and on the erosion of the purchasing power of Greeks based on the Interim Report on the Economy published by the GSEE Labor Institute, demonstrate that the popular censure is neither a form of fanaticism nor hysteria, but is based on realistic, measurable problems, in the face of which the ruling party is at the very least turning a blind eye.
An alternative for tomorrow? There isn't one. The opposition party (PASOK) has not convinced the majority, given the political cost that the party has borne in the past, but also the ideological proximity to New Democracy under Kyriakos Mitsotakis. Meanwhile, all the other parties enjoy a following but without any clear positions on the country's most serious problems, they are perceived by definition as solutions of objections anger and only, without political substance and without being able to build a relationship of electoral trust that would give them a comparative advantage in the coming elections.
There are two alternatives without a governing New Democracy on the horizon, at least for the present: The first, for the progressive parties to water down their wine and create the conditions for a progressive front. For the common good, of course, they should propose cost-effective solutions during their negotiations, far from embellishments and populism, something they have failed at very resoundingly to date. The second, the rise of the far right and the new right in whatever form it appears, with irrational nonsense like "we don't hate Muslims enough" and "we should review the marriage of same-sex couples" as if these would have any realistic political translation.
The political future of the country, for peculiarly different reasons, appears equally doubtful as the future of the international political scene.
